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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein Appellant seeks 
reinstatement in the office of attorney general. Although 
not specifically plead by Appellant, it appears to be an 
action in the nature of a mandamus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Appellant's Complaint in the lower Court. That motion was 
h.eard by the Honorable Jay E. Banks on the 16th day of 
July, 1981. The lower Court granted Respondent's motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, David L. Wilkinson, seeks affir-
mance of the Order dismissing Appellant's Complaint in the 
lower Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case wis disposed of in the lower Court on 
a Motion to Dismiss. There was no evidentiary hearing. 
The facts alleged in Appellant's Complaint and attached 
exhibits and the exhibit attached to Respondent's Supple-
mental Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss pro-
vide the basis for the only facts before the Court. 
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The Appellant was hired in the attorney 
general's office in November 1968. He became the Deputy 
Attorney General ~nder Vernon B. Romney in J~nuary 1969. 
(R. 2) In 1.973, the Attorney General Career Service 
Act was passed [67-5-6 ~ ~· U.C.A. 1953 (as amended 
1973)]. Appellant ran for the office of attorney general 
in 1976 and in November of that year was elected. He· 
took office in January 1977 (R. 2). In 1980, Appellant 
sought reelection and was defeated in the primary election 
by the Respondent. Appellant discussed with Respondent 
or his agent the possibility of being_r .. ehired jn the at-
torney general's -office February 28, 1981. (R. 3) Appel-
lant was advised by the Chief Deputy Attorney General on 
April 29, 1981 that Appellant's application for employment 
had been submitted to the screening committee but that 
his application was not one of the five to come out of 
said committee. (R. 9) 
Appellant filed an appeal to the State Merit 
System Counci 1 on June 30, 1981. The appeal to the council 
w a s f r om t h e '! A d v e r s e De c i s i o n o f A t t o r n e y G e n e r a 1 " ( R . 3 8 ) . 
The disposition of that appeal is not part of the record 
on appeal. 
The Appellant has returned to private law practice. 
He is earning "more money than the salary he would be paid 
on the staff of the Attorney General 1 s office." (R. 4) 
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POINT I 
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 67-5-11 U.C.A. 
DO NOT REQUIRE THE RESPONDENT TO REINSTATE 
THE APPELLANT TO A POSITION OF EMPLOYMENT 
WITHIN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE. 
Section 67-5-11, U.C.A. provides: 
An a t torn e y i n a career .s tat us accept -
ing appointment to a position in state govern-
ment which is exempt from the merit provisions 
of Chapter 13 of Title 67 shall upon termination 
of such appointment or employment, unless he is 
discharged for cause, be reinstated in the 
career status in the office of the attorney 
general at a salary not less than that which 
he was receiving at the time of his appriintment, 
and the time spent in such other position shall 
be credited toward his seniority in the ~areer 
service. 
Appellant claims that he was an attorney in a 
ca re er status po s i ti on i n 19 7 6 when he ran for and was e 1 e ct e d 
to the office of attorney general. He claims he left career 
status when be became attorney general and that he has the 
right to reinstatement to career status under· the terms of 
67-5-11. 
It is undisputed that the Appellant was elected 
to the office of attorney general and not appointed. It 
is also undisputed that the position of attorney general is 
not a "merit" or "careeer status" position. Respondent sub-
mits that the lower Court correctly ruled that as an elected 
official the Appellant did not come within the provisions of 
- 3-
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67-5-11 since this section applies to those "accepting 
appointment to a position in state government" and Ap-
pellant did not "accept appointment" to the position of 
attorney general. 
ln the first portion of 67-5-11, the class 
of attorneys entitled to reinstatement is identified. 
That class includes "An attorney in career status accept-
ing appointment to a position in state government which 
is exempt from the merit provisions of Chapter 13 of 
Title 67 .... 11 The classification of those entitled to 
-
reinstatement is determined by this portion of-the language 
of the statute. Those falling within the class are those 
who (1) had attained career status within the attorney 
general's office and (2) left career status to accept "ap-
pointment 11 to an exempt position under Chapter 13 of Title 
67. The Appellant does not fall within the clear and unam-
biguous classification as established by 67-5-11 because he 
did not accept appointment to hi·s position as attorney 
general but ran for and. was elected to that office. Ap-
pellant concedes that the terms election and appointment 
do not mean the same thing. In his brief he states: 
Appellant certainly does not argue that 
to "elect" and to "appoint" are the same 
thing. Thus he has no quarrel with the 
definitions given to those terms by the 
Supreme Courts of California and West Vir-
ginia quoted at length in R. 19 and 20. 
They simply are of no value in deciding 
the case at bar. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. 
- LI._ 
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Appellant takes the position that those offi-
cials elected to office are included in Section 67-5-11 
not because they fall within the 11 appointed" terminal ogy 
but because of the inclusion of the terms 11 or employment" 
in the statute. It must be noted at the outset that no-
where in 67-5-11 does the term "elected" appear. The 
words "or employment" do not appear in that portion of 
the statute that establish the class of attorneys entitled 
to reinstatement. The terms 11 or employment 11 are used in 
-· t h a t p o r t i o n .o f t h e s t a t u t e w h i c h s p e c i f i e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s 
that make the class eligible for reinstatement. The Ap-
pellant takes the position that the terms "or employment" 
must be read in the disjunctive and therefore must include 
elected officials. This position is untenable for the 
following reasons. First, if the terminology "or employ-
ment11 as used in the context of 67-5-11 is to be construed 
in the disjunctive to expand the. class of attorneys entitled 
to reinstatement, then the class would include all attorneys 
who left the attorney general •s office to accept "employ-
ment." For example: The attorney who left the attorney 
general 1 s office to accept employment within the private 
sector and then some years later decided he wanted to 
return to the attorney general 1 s office would be entitled 
to reinstatement. The office of t~e attorney general 
would become unmanagable because attorneys in most 
-5-
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positions within the office would be subject to being 
11 bumped 11 by some attorney who had years before left to 
accept other 11 employment. 11 Clearly the provisions of 
Section 67-5-11 are not intended to be interpreted so 
that such circumstances would result. It is clear that 
the use of the terminology 11 or employment" must relate 
to the employment or work done by the person accepting 
the appointment. Second, there is a perfectly logical 
explanation for the use of the "or emplo~ment 11 termin-
ology in this section. One may accept an appointment 
f o r _a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d o f t i me , i . e--. 2 ye a rs _and then 
terminate his employment prior to the expiration of the 
term for which the appointment was made. 
he may quit before the two years is up. 
In other words, 
Under these 
circumstances the "appointment" period has not terminated 
(two years) but the employment engaged in pursuant to the 
appointment has terminated because the appointee has 
voluntarily ended it. 
Finally, if the provisions of 67-5-11 required 
the reinstatement of elected State officers, the following 
scenario would be possible. A career status attorney could 
leave the attorney general's office, run for and be elected 
to the office of lieutenant governor two terms of four years, 
then run for and be elected to office of attorney general 
for two terms of four years, then when unsuccessful in his 
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bid for governor expect to be reinstated in the attorney 
general's office. After sixteen years of employment out-
side the office pursuing a political career he would 
expect a position to be available to him in the attorney 
general's office. Respondent submits such construction 
of 67-5-11 was never intended by the L~gislature. 
As heretofore ment1oned, the term "election" 
or "elected" does not appear in Section .67-5-11. The 
term "appointment" appears three times. That the terms 
- appointment and election ~re not synonj~ous is clear 
from a reading of Section 67-19-15 U.C.A. 1953 as amended 
1979, wherein it is provided: 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by 
law or rules and regulations promulgated 
hereunder for federally aided programs, 
the following positions shall be exempt 
from the career service provisions of 
this act: 
(a) The governor, members of the 
legislature, and all other elected 
state officers; 
(b)_ Persons appointed to fill 
vacancies in elective positions, em-
ployees of the state legislature, 
employees of the state judiciary, 
members of boards and commissions, 
and heads of departments appointed 
by the governor, state and local 
officials serving ex officio, and 
members of state and local boards, 
and councils appointed by the gov-
erning bodies of the departments. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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This section establishes two classes of 
exempt positions. One class is comprised of elected 
o ff i c i a 1 s [ 6 7 - 1 9 -.1 5 ( 1 ) ( a ) J a n d t h e o th e r c 1 a s s i s 
composed of persons appointed to such positions 
[67-19-15(1)(b)J. The provision in the Attorney 
§eneral 's Career Service Act that is the subject of 
the instant action only refers to one of these two 
categories of exempt positions by providing: "An 
attorney in a career status accepting appointment 
to a position in siate government w~tch is exempt 
from the merit provisions of Chapter 13 of Title 
6 7 . . . 11 i s e n t i t 1 e-d - to re i n s t a t em e n t . ( Sec t i o n 6 7 - 5 -
11, supra.) It should be noted that 67-19-15 is the 
replacement for Section 67-13-6 which was repealed in 
1979. The Attorney General's Career Service Act was 
not amended to reflect this change. This provision 
clearly references to positions filled by appointment 
under 67-19-15(.l)(b) but does not make any reference 
to those holding positions to which they were elected 
[67-19-15(1)(a)J. Had the Legislature intended to in-
clude those holding elected positions among those 
entitled to reinstatement, surely they would have made 
reference to those being elected to office in 67-5-11. 
This is particularly true in view of the separation of 
the two classes in 67-19-15. 
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It would, Respondent submits, have been a simple 
matter for the Legislature to have drafted 67-5-11 to read 
11 An attorney in career status who either accepts appointment .. 
or is elected to a position in State government which is 
exempt from the merit prov_isions of Chapter 13 of Title 67 
shall ... be reinstated. 11 The fact that the Legislature 
omitted. the language including persons elected to such posi-
tions must be interpreted to mean that it ~as intended not 
to include elected officials within the scope of the rein-
statement provision of 67-5-11. 
Regarding the omission of words in a sta~ute, 
the following pronouncement is made in Sutherland Statutory 
Construction: 
As said in a leading British case: uTo 
discover the true construction of any par-
ticular clause of a statute, the first thing 
to be attendant to, no doubt, is the actual 
language of t~e clause itself as introduced 
by the preamble; second, the words or expres-
sions which are obviously by design omitted; 
third, the connection of the clause with 
other clauses in the same statute, and the 
conclusions which on comparison with other 
clauses, may reasonably and obviously be 
d r a w n . . . . 11 v·o 1. 2 A , S u t h e r 1 a n d S ta t u t o r y 
Construction, Section 46.05, p. 56 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
It is further stated in that same treatise: 
Words may not be supplied in a statute 
when the statute is intelligible without the 
addition of the alleged omission ... where 
the omission is not plainly indicated .... 
Vol. 2A, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 
Section 47.38, p. 173. 
-9-
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In the instant case the statute is clear and not 
ambiguous. The addition of the word or words necessary to 
include attorneys being "elected" to posit:ions in State 
government is not necessary to make the statute intelligible, 
and the omission of such a provision is not plainly indi-
cated by the statute. Respondent submits that wh~re such 
language is omitted from a statute, it must be presumed 
that such was intended by the Legislature unless such an 
omission would render the statute absurd ~r unintelligible. 
The Supreme Court of the St4te of Utah has been 
very reluctant to alter the terms of the statutes of this 
State and has indicated that such changes, if they are to 
be made, are legislative matters and not for the jvdiciary. 
In the case of Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 u·.2d 138, 140-141, 
4 3 4 P . 2 d 4 4 9 ( 19 6 7) , ·the Supreme C o.u rt stated : 
... The enactment of the statute pre-
scribing this procedure is the legislative 
prerogative. It carries with it the pre-
sumptions that it is valid, and that the 
words and phrases were chosen advisedly to 
express legislative intent. The statute 
should not be stricken down nor applied 
other than in accordance with its literal 
wording unless it is so unclear ·or confused 
as to be wholly beyond reason or inoperable .... 
As indicated in the above-cited case, the Utah 
Supreme Court has refused to read into statutes that which 
does not appear in their clear language.. Under the statute, 
those career status attorneys that accept appointment to 
-10-
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positions in State Government are entitled to re-
instatement. That statute does not refer to attor-
neys elected to such position. The Court should not 
add the term 11 elected 11 to the statute. 
A further reason for finding that Appel-
lant does not fall within the provisions of 67-5-11 
is that this section applies to those 11 accepting 
. 
appointment" to an exempt position. Appellant did not 
•• 
11 accept 11 an _appointment, he sought election to the 
position and was elected. 
Appellant seems to argue that because Sec-
tion 67-5-13 U.C.A. allows an attorney in career status 
to take a leave of absence without pay to participate 
in partisan political campaigns as a- candidate that 
somehow the provisions of Section 67-5-11 must be 
interpreted to mean that if the candidate who has 
taken a leave of absence is successful and is elected 
to and takes office, his position in the attorney 
general's office must be held open for him. The 
pertinent provisions of that section are: 
(2) No attorney in a career status 
shall be a candidate for any partisan 
political office, but upon application 
to the attorney general he shall be 
granted a leave of absence without pay 
-11-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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but without loss of existing seniority 
to participate in a partisan political 
campaign either as an officer or as a 
candidate .... 
67-5-13(2) U.C.A. (Emphasis added.) 
The above-cited statutory provision clearly 
applies only to those wishing to participate in partisan 
political campaigns. This section does not provide for 
reinstatement of those candidates who are elected to the 
office they seek. This statutory provisi»n is not limited 
to candidates for State office but ill partisan political 
offices. If Appellant's contention were to prevail and 
67-5-13 required reinstatement of candidates who were 
elected after their term in office ended~ it would expand 
the class of those entitled to reinstatement to include 
those elected to federal office such as senators and 
congressmen and those local offices that are partisan 
in nature such as county attorney or county commission. 
Had the Legislature intended to include attorneys elected 
to these po s i ti on s e i t h_e r under 6 7- 5- 13 or 6 7 - 5- 11 , sure 1 y 
it would have provided for them in the lang~age of the 
statutes that would not require tortuous manipulation of 
the wording. Since neither the provisions of 67-5-11 nor 
67-5-13 provide for the reinstatement of career status 
-12-
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attorneys to a position in the attorney general 1 s office 
who are elected to office, it is clear that the Legis-
lature did not intend for them to be included within 
the class entitled to reinstatement. 
POINT II 
COMPARISONS BET\~EEN STATE "MERIT EMPLOYEES" 
AND "CAREER STATUS ATTORNEYS" DEMONSTRATE 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS ARE IN~ERROR. 
Appellant argues that attorneys in the attorney 
general's office under the career service program are 
given preferred treatment in that they are permitted to 
be a candidate for public office and retain their career 
status by taking a leave of absence. Respondent submits 
that a similar provision applies to all State merit employ-
ees. Section 67-19-19 provides: 
(1) The director of personnel 
management shall promulgate rules to 
provide for limitations upon the political 
activities of state officers and employ-
ees covered ~nder career service provi-
sions. These rules shall be drafted and 
interpreted to protect the officer or 
employee from political exploitation or 
abuse and to allow individual state of-
ficers and employees the broadest amount 
of personal political participation 
consistent with loyal service to their 
superiors in state government. 
-13-
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The rules shall incorporate, among 
others the following provisions: 
(a) 
(b) No officer or employee in career 
service shall be a candidate for any polit-
ical office, provided that upon proper 
application, an officer or employee-may 
be granted leave of absence without pay, 
without loss of existing seniority or ten-
ure to participate in a political cal'T:npaign,-
either as an officer or as a candidat€; 
however, time spent during political leave 
shall not be counted for seniority purposes 
as being in service .... (Emphasis added.) 
The provision above quoted closely parallels 
the provisions of 67-5-13 in that both allow e~ployees in 
career status a leave of absence to participate in a polit-
ical campaign as a candidate. The provisions of 67-19-19 
specificallY indicate that the terms of the statute be 
interpreted to favor merit employee political participa-
tion. It must be emphasized that both 67-19-19 and 67-5-13 
apply only to candidates for public office and has no ap-
plication to those elected to public office. 
The statutory provision regarding rehiring of 
all "career service 11 State employees that parallels the 
Attorney General's Career Service Act ·provisions of 67-5-11 
is found in 67-19-17 and provides as follows: 
Any career service employee accepting 
an ~poi n t men t to an exempt po s i ti on who 
is not retained by the appointing officer, 
unless discharged for cause as provided by 
this act or by regulation shall: 
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(1) Be appointed to any career 
service position for which the employee 
qualifies in a pay grade comparable to 
the employee 1 s last position -in the 
career service provided an opening 
exists; or 
(2) Be appointed to any lesser 
career service position for which the 
employee qualifies pending the opening 
of a position described in subsection 
(1) of this section .... 
67-19-17 U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1979) 
(Emphasis added.) 
As in the attorney general 1 s career service 
statute, (67-5-11), provision for those elected to exempt 
positions is conspicuously absent in the above-cited 
statute. Respondent submits that had the Legislature 
intended to include elected officials in the class of 
State employees entitled to reinstat~m~nt (~ttorneys or 
otherwise) it would have made reference to 11 elected" 
officials somewhere in one of these statutory provisions. 
One can only conclude that the omission was intended and 
that those elected to office were not intended to be in-
eluded within the reinstatement ~revisions of either 
67-5-11 or 67-19-17. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS NOT AN ATTORNEY IN A CAREER 
STATUS POSITION PRIOR TO HIS BEING ELECTED 
ATTORNEY GENERAL. 
Appellant was first employed in the attorney 
general's office in November 1968. He was appointed the 
-15-
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deputy attorney general in January 1969 and was in ~hat 
position at the time the Attorney General 1 s Career 
Service Act was enacted in 1973. (R. 2) He retained that 
position until his election to the office of attorney 
general in 1976. Section 67-9-1 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) 
provides: 
T h e S e c r e ta r y o f S ta t e , t h-e .S ta t e 
Auditor, the State Treasurer, the Attorney 
General and the superintendent of public 
instruction, and the district attorneys as 
provided in section 67-7-13 may each app0~nt 
a deputy, who may, during the absence or 
disability of the principal, perform all 
the duties pertaining to th.e.office .... 
The appointment of the dep-uty shall _be irn 
writing and shall be revocable at the 
pleasure of the pr1nc1pal .... (Emphasis 
added.) 
The provisions of the abov~-cited statute ~learly 
indicate that the position of deputy attorney general within 
t h e a t t o r n e y g e n e r a 1 1 s o f f i c e i s a n 11 e x em p t 11 p o s i t i o,rm • Th e 
person holding that position does so at the 11 pleasune 11 of 
th e a t torn e y genera 1 . I n other w o rd s , he co u 1 d be d ii.s mi s s e d 
at any time for any reason or no reason. The enactment of 
the Attorney General Career Service Act 67-5-6 et~· 
(Career Service Act) did not repeal the p.rovisions of 67-
9-1. There are no specific provisions in the Career Service 
Act that make the position of deputy attorney general a 
career position. Therefore, Appellant does not qualify 
for reinstatement in any event under the provisions of 67-5-11. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT FAILED TO EXHAUST HIS ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE REMEDY TIMELY, THEREFORE THE 
INSTANT CAUSE OF ACTION MUST FAIL. 
This Court has held that where administrative 
remedi.es are available, they must be exhausted prior to 
the initiation of legal action. In Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 7 U.2d 15 at 19, 316 
P.2d 549 (1957), this Court held: 
In appraising the effect of the statute 
relied upon by the parties, there are some 
fund amen ta 1 r u 1 es which favor the po s i ti-on 
of the Tax Commission. Primary among these 
is the general rule that before one may seek 
a review of the action of an administrative 
body, he must exhaust his administrative 
remedies and thereby give the agency an op-
portunity to correct any error it may have 
made. 
The Attorney General 1 s Career Service Act con-
tains the following provision: 
An attorney in a career status who is 
aggrieved by a decision of. the attorney gen-
eral may app~al the decision to the merit 
system council as provided for in section 
67-13-3, which shall set a time and date 
for hearing of the appeal, and the attorney 
shall have a right to appear in person or 
by counsel. 
67-5-12(3) U.C.A. (1953 as amended 1973) 
Chapter 13 of Title 67 was repealed in 1979 by 
Chapter 139 Section 36 and now appears in the Utah Code as 
67-19-1 through 67-19-29. 
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In the instant case the Appellant did attempt 
to appeal administratively the decision of the attorney 
general not to reinstate him. In a letter dated June 
30, 1981 written by Appellant to the Utah State Merit 
System Council Appellant stated: 
Pursuant to Sec. 67-5-12 U.C.A. 1953, 
I hereby appeal the decision of Attorney 
General David L. Wilkinson not to reinstate 
me as assistant attorney general in that 
office in accordance with Sec .. 67-5-11, 
1953. 
Would ·you kindly set a time and place 
for the hearing of this appeal. lt would 
be helpful if this were before July 16th 
as the District Court is hearing a related 
motion at that time. (R. 38) 
As indicated in the above-mentioned letter, 
Appellant has made some attempt to utilize the admin-
istrative review process referred to in 67-5-12. The 
process as outlined in the statutory review procedure 
provides: 
No appeal shall be submitted under this 
Chapter unless (a) it is submitted within 20 
working days ·after the event giving rise to 
the appea 1. ... 
67-19-24 U.C.A. (1953 as ame·nded 1979) 
In the instant cause, giving Appellant the 
benefit of the latest possible date of "the event giving 
rise to-the appeal," Appellant failed to submit his appeal 
within the 20 day time period required by the statute. 
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Based on his allegations final notification of refusal 
to reinstate was given to Appellant on April 29, 1981. 
(R. 4, 9) Appellant's first attempt to appeal admin-
istratively the decision which aggrieved him was made by 
his letter dated June 30, 1981. There was a lapse of time 
exceeding 60 days between the 11 event giving rise to the 
appea 1 11 and the appea 1, a period wel 1 beyond the time 
within which said appeal must be submitte9. 
Respondent submits that (1) the Appellant is 
required to eihaust his administrative remedy prior to 
seeking judicial redress, and (2) his failure to timely 
seek administrative review is jurisdictional and fatal to 
the instant cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
The statutory provisions allowing for reinstate-
ment of career status attorneys contained in 67-5-11 clearly 
a n d u n a m b i g u o u s l y a p p ly o n l y. t o t h o s e 11 a c c e p t i n g a p p o i n t me n t 
to a position in state government." If, assuming arguendo, 
the Appellant had achieved career status within the attorney 
general's office, he freely and voluntarily gave up career 
status to seek and obtain election to an elective noncareer 
status office. He knew when he became elected his term in 
office was four years and if not reelected the position would 
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end by operation of law. Appellant complains that he 
gave up his private practice to attain career status. 
If this is correct it was, of course, a decision he made 
presumably knowing its consequences. He also gave up 
career status to take elective office; again it must 
b e p r e s um e d h e k n e w t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f s u c h a d e c i s i o .n • 
Respondent submits that the lower Court 
properly dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint and any one of 
the three bases presented to it are sufficient to support 
that decision, to-wit: 
1. The statutory provisions (67-5-11) relied 
upon by Appellant do not apply to him as an elected of-
fice holder. 
2. He failed to gain career status prior to 
being elected to the office of attorney general. 
3. He failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies timely. 
Respondent respectfully requests this Court 
to sustain the decision of the lower Court dismissing 
Appellant's Complaint. 
DATED this a /Sf day of April, 1982. 
. c 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two_ copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, 
postage prepaid, to Mark S. Gustavson, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 630 East South Temple, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84102, this 21st day of April, 1982. 
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